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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920307-CA 
v. : 
DAVID BRYANT WICKS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a sentence following a 
conviction for forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990), in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court in and for Iron County, the Honorable Robert T. 
Braithwaite, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did defendant fail to preserve for appeal his claim 
concerning insufficient time to challenge the presentence report, 
and if not, did the trial court fail to provide defendant with 
sufficient time to allow defendant to controvert alleged 
inaccuracies in the report? An appellate court will not consider 
issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Steqqell, 
660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983). "For questions of fact [involved in 
sentencing decisions], frequently constituting threshold 
inquiries that must be satisfied prior to addressing the legal 
intricacies, a 'clearly erroneous' standard applies." State v. 
Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048, 1049-50 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Did defendant fail to provide an adequate record 
for review by this Court? It is a well established rule of 
appellate procedure that the party asserting error has the "duty 
and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate 
record." State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 1982), 
cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). An appellate court will 
presume regularity in the proceedings below where no transcript 
of the sentencing hearing was provided the appellate court and 
there was no suggestion that a presentence report was effectively 
concealed from the defendant. State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 
215 (Utah 1983). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
sentencing defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment and a 
$ 5,000 fine? "[B]efore the reviewing court may overturn the 
sentence given by the trial court[,] 'it must be clear that the 
actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute 
an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 
(Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 
(Utah 1978) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
4. Did the trial court improperly refuse to order 
defendant undergo a 90-day diagnostic evaluation ? An appellate 
court will not disturb a sentence or a denial of an diagnostic 
evaluation unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. State 
2 
v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989); State v, Russell, 
772 P.2d 971, 971 (Utah 1989) • 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with forgery, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
(1992) (R. 3). In exchange for a reduced charge, defendant pled 
guilty to forgery, a third degree felony (R. 8-15). Thereafter, 
the court sentenced defendant to a term of not more than five 
years in the Utah State Prison, to be served consecutively with 
another conviction in Washington County, upon which defendant had 
been sentenced six days earlier. The court also ordered 
defendant to pay a fine of $5,000.00 and to pay restitution in 
the amount of $750.00 (R. 51-53; T. 19). Defendant appeals from 
that order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to his sentencing, defendant sought the 
production of various documents which would inform him of the 
existence of fugitive warrants appearing on his record and which 
he had learned would affect the recommendations of the Department 
of Corrections concerning his sentencing (see Defendant's 
3 
Petition for Records, Document and Things, R. 37-38).x The 
record is silent as to whether defendant received any documents 
in response to his motions. However, defendant was sentenced on 
a separate felony in the Washington County District Court on 
April 8, 1992, six days before his sentencing in this matter, 
during which the same presentence report, less an addendum, was 
used (T. 2-3).2 
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing defense 
counsel informed the trial court as follows: 
Bear in mind that Mr. Wicks has informed me 
that he didn't get an opportunity to review 
this report in Washington County. That here 
in Iron County was really the first time that 
he's had a chance to go through the report. 
And I should point out that he really didn't 
have a chance to really read the report, but 
I pointed out the — what I considered to be 
the key factors in the report as to why the 
evaluation came out the way it did, which was 
his extensive record that is set out in 
there." 
(T. 2-3) (emphasis added). He claimed that the report 
1
 Defendant also filed an affidavit stating that his lawyer, 
who is also representing defendant on appeal, was not assisting 
him in obtaining the necessary documents, and a motion requesting 
that he be allowed to proceed pro se (see Affidavit, dated March 
31, 1992 (R. 39) and Motion for Self Representation, filed March 
27, 1992 (R. 34). Notwithstanding defendant's complaints of his 
counsel's performance prior to the sentencing hearing, no claim 
of ineffective assistance had been made, and although defendant's 
motion for self representation does not appear to have been 
explicitly ruled on, it is apparent that defendant abandoned any 
claim he might have had when, at the sentencing, he did not 
respond to the opening remarks concerning pending motions (T. 2), 
and when he did not object to Mr. Jackson's represention on 
appeal (T. 14). 
2
 A complete copy of the sentencing hearing is attached at 
Addendum B. 
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inaccurately referenced numerous fugitive warrants and 
convictions (T. 4-8). Howeverf the trial court noted that, 
notwithstanding these alleged inaccuracies, there were sufficient 
accurately reflected convictions to support the recommendations 
made in the presentence report, and, in view of defendant's 
having lied to the court before, the court would sentence in 
accordance with the recommendations (T. 17-19). The court also 
refused to order a 90-day diagnostic evaluation for defendant (T. 
15-16). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant waived his claim that the trial court did not 
allow Him sufficient time in which to rebut alleged inaccuracies 
in the presentence report. At the sentencing hearing defendant 
remarked only that he had not had much opportunity to review the 
report* He neither indicated that the opportunity was 
insufficient nor did he request a continuance. In any event, 
because defendant received a similar report six days earlier, he 
had sufficient opportunity to challenge the report, of which he 
took full advantage. 
Defendant has not provided this Court with a copy of 
the presentence report, and so it should presume regularity in 
the proceedings below and decline to consider defendant's claims. 
However# even without the report, the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing shows that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive prison terms 
and ordering him to pay a $ 5,000 fine. Defendant admitted that 
5 
the "poor" rating he received on the matrix might still not 
change even if the alleged inaccuracies were discounted. 
Further, the sentence, based on defendant's having received a 
"poor" rating, was in accord with the Utah Sentence and Release 
Guidelines. 
The trial court properly refused to order defendant 
undergo a 90-day diagnostic evaluation. First, defendant's claim 
on appeal, that he requested the diagnostic evaluation for the 
purpose of further challenging the inaccuracies in the 
presentence report, was not made to the trial court. Therefore, 
the claim has not been preserved for appeal and this Court should 
decline to review it. Second, the transcript of the sentencing 
hearing indicates that the trial court had sufficient information 
on which to base its refusal to order defendant undergo a 90-day 
diagnostic evaluation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE AN OBJECTION IN THE 
TRIAL COURT THAT HE HAD INSUFFICIENT TIME TO 
REBUT EVIDENCE COLLECTED IN THE PRESENTENCE 
REPORT, THEREBY WAIVING THE CLAIM ON APPEAL. 
IN ANY EVENT, THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCLOSURE OF 
THE PRESENTENCE REPORT TO DEFENDANT, PLUS 
DEFENDANT'S OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW A 
COMPARABLE PRESENTENCE REPORT SIX DAYS PRIOR 
TO HIS SENTENCING, ACCORDED DEFENDANT DUE 
PROCESS. 
A. Defendant Waived his Claim 
on Appeal. 
"As a general rule, a timely and specific objection 
must be made in order to preserve an issue for appeal. Absent a 
6 
timely objection, [an appellate court] will review an alleged 
error only if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it 
constitutes "plain error." State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-
21 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). 
At the sentencing hearing defendant informed the trial 
court, through counsel, that he had reviewed the presentence 
report, but that he had not really read it (T. 2-3). However, he 
in no way indicated to the court that he had not had sufficient 
time to consider the report, nor did he claim that he had not had 
"sufficient time to properly challenge the inaccuracies contained 
in the presentence investigation report," as he now claims for 
the first time on appeal (Point I of Appellant's Brief at 8). 
Further, at no time did defendant move the court for a 
continuance in order to challenge the report's alleged 
inaccuracies. On appeal, defendant has not claimed the trial 
court's handling of the presentence report was plain error. 
Therefore, this Court should decline to review the merits of 
defendant's claim. 
The State's resort to waiver in this matter is further 
strengthened in the context of defendant's challenge by State v. 
Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). In Sanwick, the 
defendant was denied the opportunity to cross-examine his 
daughters, victims of the offense to which he had pled guilty and 
whose statements were the basis of damaging testimony of others 
whose statements were included in the presentence report. JEci. at 
708-09. In holding the defendant was not denied due process, 
7 
notwithstanding his right to information that would bear on his 
sentencing, the Utah Supreme Court cited with approval State v. 
Tranqsrud, 651 P.2d 37 (Mont. 1982), wherein the Supreme Court of 
Montana also held that there was no denial of due process where a 
defendant took the stand to rebut the accuracy of the presentence 
report. Id. at 40. Though not specifically referenced by 
Sanwick, the supreme court in Tranqsrud also found that the 
defendant had waived for appeal the claim that he had 
insufficient time to acquire witnesses to rebut information 
contained in the presentence report where he had failed to 
request a continuance from the court. Ibid. 
B. Defendant Had Sufficient 
Access to the Presentence Report. 
Fundamental fairness requires that the trial court 
disclose to a criminal defendant his presentence report prior to 
sentencing in order to better insure that the trial court's 
sentencing discretion is based on accurate information. State v. 
Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980); accord. State v. 
Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982); State v. Howell, 707 
P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). 
"If the defendant thinks the report inaccurate, he 
should then have the opportunity to bring such inaccuracies to 
the court's attention." Lipskv, 608 P.2d at 1244; Casarez, 656 
P.2d at 1008. See also Sanwick, 713 P.2d at 709 (noting the 
admissibility of hearsay in the presentence report "as long as 
the defendant had the opportunity to rebut the adverse evidence 
and to challenge the reliability of the evidence presented"). 
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Defendant does not claim, like the defendant in 
Lipskv, that the trial court denied him due process by denying 
him access to the presentence report, but rather that the court 
failed to provide him with sufficient time to rebut certain 
alleged inaccuracies in the report (Point I of Appellant's Brief 
at 7-8). Defendant relies on State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 
1050-51 (Utah App. 1991) (finding the defendant's access to the 
presentence report and the diagnostic evaluation for almost two 
weeks prior to defendant's second hearing afforded him sufficient 
opportunity to effectively contest the alleged factual 
inaccuracies). In so arguing, defendant misconstrues the breadth 
of rebuttal, and consequently the right of confrontation, allowed 
a defendant in a sentencing hearing by Lipskv and its progeny. 
In expanding the defendant's due process rights in 
Lipskv, the Utah Supreme Court simultaneously restricted the 
extent to which the bases of the trial court's sentencing 
decision could be exposed by a defendant. Thus, the court held 
that the defendant had a right of access to the presentence 
report prior to sentencing, for the purpose of challenging 
alleged inaccuracies, but at the same time the trial court could 
receive a presentence report without having to allow its author 
to personally appear and testify in open court to defend the 
report. Id. at 1244. 
One year later, in State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1981), the court rejected a defendant's claim that he had been 
denied due process because he was not allowed to appear at a 
9 
staff meeting of the Department of Adult Probation and Parole 
where recommendations for the presentence report were developed. 
In rejecting the defendant's challenge, the court again referred 
to the trial court's prerogatives in receiving a presentence 
report without having to require its authors to appear, stating 
that the right to disclosure was not accompanied by the right of 
confrontation. j[d. at 55. 
Finally, in Sanwick, the court cited with approval 
Tranqsrud, wherein the Montana high court held there was no 
denial of due process where a defendant was restricted to simply 
taking the stand to rebut claimed inaccuracies in the presentence 
report. Sanwick, 651 P.2d at 40. Viewed from this perspective, 
this Court's holding in Rhodes does not require a certain minimum 
period of time which a defendant must be allowed in order to 
properly challenge alleged inaccuracies in a presentence report, 
but instead merely indicates that having two weeks notice of the 
contents of a presentence report was quite sufficient for the 
defendant in that case to muster his challenge. 
Even if this Court were to find in Rhodes, a 
requirement of a certain minimal time which should be afforded a 
defendant to challenge claimed inaccuracies in a presentence 
report, a requirement nowhere to be found Lipskv and its progeny, 
or supported by any authority cited by defendant, the facts of 
this case would still support the adequacy of disclosure in this 
case. 
First, defendant was given the presentence report (T. 
10 
2). Second, defendant admitted that he had been sentenced on the 
basis of the same presentence report presented in a sentencing in 
Washington County, less an addendum prepared for the Iron County 
District Court in the present case (T. 2). The date of the 
sentencing in Washingtbn County does not formally appear in the 
record, however, defendant acknowledged in a letter to a clerk in 
the Iron County District Court that he was being sentenced in 
Washington County on April 8, 1992 (R. 45). It is also apparent 
from the record that the presentence report used to sentence 
defendant in Washington County must have been substantially 
similar to the one used in this case because defendant's counsel, 
in addition to essentially admitting that the reports were the 
same (T. 2), informed the trial court that defendant was moving 
the Washington County court to reconsider the judgment for 
reasons similar to those which he would raise in this case (T. 
3). Thus, it would appear from the record that defendant had 
access to the presentence report almost one week prior to his 
sentencing in this case, notwithstanding his assertions that he 
had not had the opportunity to review the Washington County 
presentence report (T. 3). See Mitchell, 671 P.2d at 215 
(holding the defendant's request for a remand for resentencing 
frivolous where there was no suggestion that the presentence 
report was presented in such a way as to conceal it or deter the 
defendant from inspecting it). 
Finally, defendant was freely permitted to challenge 
the alleged inaccuracies in the presentence report. He testified 
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at length that he was unaware of twenty-four arrest warrants 
listed in the report, and he denied the accuracy of nineteen 
misdemeanors (T. 7-8). He specifically denied listed convictions 
in Cleveland, Ohio, Horsham and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and 
Los Alamitos, California (T. 4-7). He also specifically 
challenged the listing of fugitive warrants in Wyoming and 
Cuyohoga County, Ohio, claiming that he knew nothing about them 
(T. 3-4). In response, the court asserted that it was not 
relying on these disputed arrest and misdemeanor convictions, but 
rather on the remaining unchallenged record set forth in the 
presentence report (T. 19-20). 
On such facts defendant cannot reasonably maintain that 
he was denied disclosure of the contents of the presentence 
report, or a sufficient opportunity to rebut the accuracy of the 
report. 
POINT II 
REGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW SHOULD BE 
PRESUMED WHERE DEFENDANT FAILED TO INCLUDE IN 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL THE PRESENTENCE REPORT. 
HOWEVER, RELYING ONLY ON THE RECORD OF THE 
SENTENCING HEARING, THE RECORD INDICATES THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT ON THE UNCHALLENGED 
INFORMATION IN THE PRESENTENCE REPORT. 
,f[B]efore the reviewing court may overturn the sentence 
given by the trial court[,] 'it must be clear that the actions of 
the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion.'M State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App. 
1991) (citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
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"The burden of showing error is on the party who seeks 
to upset the judgment." State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982)). 
In this case defendant has failed to include in the 
record on appeal the presentence report containing the alleged 
inaccuracies of which he complains and which undoubtedly formed 
the basis of the trial court's sentencing decision. On such 
failure this court may decline to review the merits of 
defendant's claim, presuming regularity in the proceedings below. 
See State v. Eloae, 762 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1988) (per curiam) 
(presuming regularity in the proceedings below where the 
defendant, challenging the trial court's discretion in denying 
him a 90-day diagnostic evaluation and sentencing him to a 
potential life sentence, failed to provide the court with a copy 
of the presentence report from which it might have assessed the 
trial court's discretion); Mitchell, 671 P.2d at 215 (presuming 
regularity in the proceedings below where, though no transcript 
of the sentencing hearing was provided the appellate court, there 
was no suggestion that a presentence report was effectively 
concealed from the defendant); but see Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1246 
n.9 rciting State v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah 1979), for 
the proposition that, in order "[t]o avoid errors, sentencing 
procedures require a somewhat stricter standard than the general 
presumption of regularity"). 
Even if this Court were to take the more rigorous 
stance, refusing to presume the regularity of the proceedings 
13 
below in absence of the presentence report, the proceedings at 
the sentencing hearing amply show the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion.3 
After having challenged in detail the accuracy of the 
presentence report's list of his prior crimes, defendant admitted 
to three prior felony convictions and numerous prior 
confrontations with the authorities, albeit encounters in which 
3
 While no Utah case has expressly held that following a 
defendant's identification of inaccurate information in the 
presentence report the court may then proceed to sentence him in 
reliance on the accurate, unchallenged information in the report, 
the proposition is implicit in Lipskv and its progeny, and 
express in the caselaw of other jurisdictions. See Lipskv, 608 
P.2d at 1249 ("The fair administration of justice at the least 
requires that the information upon which the judge relies in 
imposing punishment is accurate."); Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1050 
("The Lipskv court emphasized that the decision to compel 
disclosure of presentence reports was not intended to impinge 
upon the sentencing judge's discretion to determine what 
punishment fits both the crime and the offender. Rather, the 
court was interested in shoring up the soundness and reliability 
of the factual basis upon which the judge relies in the exercise 
of that sentencing discretion."); State v. Binqman, 745 P.2d 342, 
349 (Mont. 1987) (finding that even without the questionable 
presentence report incidents, there was substantial support for 
the challenged criminal offender designation found by the court); 
Thurlkill v. State. 551 P.2d 541, 545 (Alaska 1976) (holding that 
whenever a presentence report contains improper reference to 
"police contacts," the trial court shall indicate on the record 
that it has not relied on such information in imposing sentence). 
Indeed, in State v. Roberts, 612 P.2d 360, 361 (Utah 1980), 
a post-Lipskv case, the Utah Supreme Court found a failure to 
disclose a presentence report was not prejudicial. The defendant 
did not claim that there were inaccuracies in the report, but 
merely that the failure to furnish him with a copy prior to 
sentencing was a denial of his rights to counsel and 
confrontation of witnesses. The court upheld the sentence, 
noting that the trial court had stated the information in the 
report that it relied on and gave the defendant to refute the 
matter. The court found no prejudice where the record did not 
indicate that the defendant would have received probation if he 
had received a copy of the report prior to sentencing. 
14 
charges had either been dropped or not even filed (T. 8). He 
specifically admitted to a charge in Duval, Florida for forgery, 
which had been dismissed/ Following the prosecution's 
presentation, defense counsel acknowledged that defendant had 
lied to the court on previous occasions (T. 16-19)• In 
sentencing defendant, the trial court explicitly noted that the 
recommendations of the Adult Probation and Parole investigators 
were justified even after discounting the challenged felonies (T. 
19-20). 
Most significantly, defendant admitted that even 
discounting the challenged convictions, it was not clear that his 
classification on the matrix would change (T. 9). Defendant was 
assigned a "poor" rating in the presentence report (T. 8). The 
"General Disposition Matrix - Felonies" for determining fines and 
bails suggests a fine of $ 5,000 for a third degree felon 
assigned a "poor" rating. See Appx. C, Code of Jud. Admin. 
(1992) (attached at Addendum A). The Utah Sentence and Release 
Guidelines provide that the court may sentence a defendant to 
serve consecutive prison terms if the defendant is a fugitive. 
See Form 4, Appx., Code of Jud. Admin. (1992) (attached at 
Addendum A). While defendant denied knowledge of 24 listed 
arrest warrants in the report, he did not refute their existence. 
However, he did acknowledge the existence of at least one 
4
 See Howell, 707 P.2d at 118 (noting that in sentencing the 
trial court may also consider facts relating to dismissed charges 
in related crimes); State v. Lipskv, 639 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 
1981) ("Lipskv II") (noting the propriety of the trial court's 
considering an acquittal in sentencing). 
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fugitive warrant, issued out of Colorado Springs, on which he had 
not yet been arraigned (T. 7). Therefore, if discounting the 
challenged inaccuracies in the report might still not have 
changed defendant's classification, as defendant admits, then it 
cannot have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
have sentenced him to consecutive prison terms and a $ 5,000 
fine, a result in accord with the Code of Judicial 
Administration. Further, since the trial court had sufficient, 
accurate information on which to sentence defendant as it did, 
there was again no abuse of discretion in the sentencing. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR APPEAL THE 
ARGUMENT THAT HE REQUESTED A 90-DAY 
DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TO FURTHER DISPUTE THE 
INACCURACY OF THE PRESENTENCE REPORT. 
FURTHER, THE RECORD SUPPLIED ON APPEAL SHOWS 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUFFICIENT 
INFORMATION IN THE PRESENTENCE REPORT UPON 
WHICH TO BASE THE SENTENCE, THUS PROPERLY 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST. 
On appeal defendant claims that the trial court erred 
in refusing to order a 90-day diagnostic evaluation because: (1) 
the court deprived him of the means to challenge the accuracy of 
the presentence report and (2) the court restricted its 
consideration of legally relevant factors bearing on his 
sentencing (Point IV of Appellant's Brief at 10-11). 
A. Failure to Preserve Issue for Appeal. 
This Court should simply decline to consider 
defendant's first argument because at the sentencing hearing his 
request for the 90-day diagnostic evaluation was based 
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exclusively on his belief that he was in need of psychological 
treatment (T. 11-16). See State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144-
45 (Utah 1989) (noting general rule that the grounds for the 
objection must be distinctly and specifically stated in the trial 
court before an appellate court will review those grounds on 
appeal). 
B. 90-Day Diagnostic evaluation is Not Necessary 
if Trial Court has Enough Information. 
An appellate court will "set aside a sentence imposed 
by the trial court . . . if the trial judge fails to consider all 
legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the 
limits prescribed by law," State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 
(Utah 1989) (citations omitted), or "if it can be said that no 
reasonable man would take the view adopted by the court." State 
v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992) 
provides; 
In felony cases where the court is of 
the opinion imprisonment may be appropriate 
but desires more detailed information as a 
basis for determining the sentence to be 
imposed than has been provided by the 
presentence report, the court may in its 
discretion commit a convicted defendant to 
the custody of the Department of Corrections 
for a diagnostic evaluation for a period not 
exceeding 90 days. [Emphasis added.] 
Ordering "an evaluation before passing sentence is 
clearly within [the judge's] discretion, based on his own 
judgment of the case before him." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. 
However, the law does not compel a trial court to order a 90-day 
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diagnostic evaluation merely "because it would have given the 
judge more information on which to base the sentence." State v. 
Brown, 771 P.2d 1067, 1067-68 (Utah 1989). 
The proper inquiry is whether the court is 
"sufficiently apprised of the pertinent background facts 
concerning the defendant," Jd. at 1068 (finding that where the 
trial court had sufficient background information refusal to 
order a 90-day diagnostic evaluation was not an abuse of 
discretion); see also State v. Russell, 772 P.2d 971 (Utah 1989) 
(90-day diagnostic evaluation was not necessary because judge had 
sufficient information). 
The record of the sentencing hearing indicates that 
defendant clearly articulated his reasons for requesting a 90-day 
diagnostic evaluation and, in so doing, informed the trial court 
of his drug problem (T. 11-16, 18-19). The record also indicates 
that the trial court had sufficient information on which to 
sentence defendant (T. 8-19). Furthermore, defendant can only 
reasonably support his claim that the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to order a 90-day diagnostic evaluation by 
presenting this Court with the presentence report. Defendant has 
neither supplied the necessary record on appeal nor successfully 
refuted the report's designation of him as a "poor" candidate, 
which designation justifies the trial court, in its discretion, 
to sentence a defendant to prison rather than a treatment 
alternative. See Form 3, Appx. E, Code of Jud. Admin, (attached 
at Addendum A). See also Eloqe, 762 P.2d at 2 (per curiam) 
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(presuming regularity in the proceedings below where the 
defendant, challenging the trial court's discretion in denying 
him a 90-day diagnostic evaluation and sentencing him to a 
potential life sentence, failed to provide the court with a copy 
of the presentence report from which it might have assessed the 
trial court's exercise of discretion). Therefore, this Court 
should presume regularity in the proceedings below and find that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order 
defendant undergo a 90-day diagnostic evaluation• 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the State 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
sentence• 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 5 day of October, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
J. Bryan Jackson, Attorney for Defendant, 111 North Main, Post 
Office Box 519, Cedar City, Utah 84720, this
 :£ of October, 
1992. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992) 
76-3-404. Presentence investigation and diagnostic evalu-
ation — Commitment of defendant — Sentencing 
procedure. 
(1) (a) (i) In felony cases where the court is of the opinion imprisonment 
may be appropriate but desires more detailed information as a basis 
for determining the sentence to be imposed than has been provided 
by the presentence report, the court may in its discretion commit a 
convicted defendant to the custody of the Department of Corrections 
for a diagnostic evaluation for a period not exceeding 90 days. 
(ii) The Department of Corrections shall conduct a complete study 
and evaluation of the defendant during that time, inquiring into 
matters including: 
(A) the defendant's previous delinquency or criminal experi-
ence; 
(B) his social background; 
(C) his capabilities; 
(D) his mental, emotional, and physical health; and 
(E) the rehabilitative resources or programs which may be 
available to suit his needs. 
(b) (i) By the expiration of the commitment period, or by the expiration 
of additional commitment time the court may grant, not exceeding a 
further period of 90 days, the defendant shall be returned to the court 
for sentencing and the court,, prosecutor, and the defendant or his 
attorney shall be provided with a written diagnostic evaluation re-
port of results of the study, including any recommendations the De-
partment of Corrections or the Utah State Hospital believes will be 
helpful to a proper resolution of the case. 
(ii) Any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court is sup-
plemental to and becomes a part of the presentence investigation 
report. 
(iii) After receiving the diagnostic evaluation report and recom-
mendations, the court shall proceed to sentence a defendant in accor-
dance with the sentencing alternatives provided under Section 
76-3-201. 
(2) Any commitment for presentence investigation under this section does 
not constitute a commitment to prison. However, any person who is commit-
ted to prison following proceedings under this section shall be given credit 
against his sentence for the time spent in confinement for a presentence inves-
tigation report. 
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4 THE COURT: The Court calls State versus David Bryant 
5 Wicks. This matter is on for sentencing. There's some 
6 pending motions, I guess, since the last hearing with the 
7 Court. I've provided both defense counsel and the 
8 prosecution with copies of pro se correspondence as — as it 
9 has been received. 
10 I MR. JACKSON: I'm not sure where we're at on all of 
11 that, Your Honor, in terms of his earlier request, but we 
12 are prepared to go ahead with sentencing. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead and — there's been a 
14 presentence report prepared. 
15 And you have that? 
16 MR. JACKSON: Yeah. I've had an opportunity to go 
17 through this with Mr. Wicks. Basically, as I'm 
18 understanding what we have is actually a presentence report 
19 that was prepared through the Washington County court, in 
20 which he's been sentenced on. 
21 THE COURT: And then an addendum for this court. 
22 MR. JACKSON: And then an addendum for this court. 
23 Okay. He was sentenced in Washington County — he 
24 was sentenced in Washington County to serve on a 
25 third-degree felony, zero to five, and I guess the — the 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
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1 real question that we have in this case, really, is whether 
2 or not this case should run consecutively or concurrently 
3 with that order of commitment. 
4 The — what Mr. Wicks has requested that I ask the 
5 Court do is to consider — consider rather than the 
6 commitment, an order to have him go up and serve a 
7 diagnostic — have a diagnostic evaluation done. He feels 
8 that he is going to be entitled to this partly because he 
9 has made a motion in Washington County to have the Court 
10 reconsider judgment down there. And the reasons are 
11 similar, and I'll go through those. 
12 Bear in mind that Mr. Wicks has informed me that 
13 he didn't get an opportunity to review this report in 
14 Washington County. That here in Iron County was really the 
15 first time that he's had a chance to go through the report. 
16 And I should point out that he really didn't have a chance 
17 to really read the report, but I pointed out the — what I 
18 considered to be the key factors in the report as to why the 
19 evaluation came out the way it did, which was his extensive 
20 record that is set out in there. 
21 And in the record, Mr. Wicks — basically I'll go 
22 ahead and give this to the Court. But he's made a notation 
23 by the offenses that he doesn't feel apply to him. And one 
24 of those is the first offense listed July 19, 1991. It's a 
25 bad check. It's a Casper, Wyoming, matter. 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
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1 Do you want to go ahead and tell the Court — 
2 MR. WICKS: Yes. 
3 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
4 MR. WICKS; Your Honor, I don't have an arrest warrant 
5 from Casper, Wyoming, as far as I know. At least I have not 
6 been served with one. 
7 In the presentence report, it also has that I have 
8 a warrant in the state of Ohio. 
9 MR. JACKSON: Yeah. Cleveland, Ohio, on 8-9-91. 
10 There's an arrest warrant listed there, plus also Cuyahoga. 
11 MR. WICKS: Cuyahoga County. A conviction. 
12 MR. JACKSON: Cuyahoga County. A conviction — there's 
13 I a conviction in Cleveland, Ohio. There's a warrant issued 
14 in Cuyahoga, Ohio, 8-20-91. 
15 You're saying that one doesn't apply to you? 
16 MR. WICKS: No, Your Honor. Because Ohio — the state 
17 of Ohio is the one that released me to the state of Utah for 
18 extradition. I was not convicted there; so, how can they 
19 have a warrant for me when they gave me to this state? I 
20 haven't been released since Ohio released me to this state. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 I MR. JACKSON: Okay. And then we have one in Oklahoma 
23 that you've made a notation of for cocaine. 
24 MR. WICKS: Yes. I was stopped by a police officer 
25 there, and I was brought in for possession of cocaine. 
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1 There was residue in a bowl. But I wasn't the driver of the 
2 car, and it wasn't my car. I was released. I was never 
3 convicted as it says on here for 353 days. 
4 MR. JACKSON: It does indicate that he was sentenced for 
5 353 days. 
6 I MR. WICKS: I wasn't. I was released, because I wasn't 
7 the driver of the car, nor was I the owner of the car. And 
8 it wasn't found on my person; so, they dismissed it. 
9 THE COURT: Were you in jail 353 days — 
10 MR. WICKS: No, sir. 
11 THE COURT: — waiting for trial or anything? 
12 MR. WICKS: No, sir. I was released two days after I 
13 was in jail, and the public defender says — said something 
14 about a standing that I— I didn't — I was not the owner of 
15 the car, and I wasn't the driver, and he — they — I was 
16 released, and I never got sentenced to 300 and some days on 
17 anything like that. 
18 MR. JACKSON: Then he's noted Maywood, Illinois, there's 
19 a — there's something. It makes reference to a Florida 
20 warrant. Extradited to Florida. 
21 Were you picked up in Illinois on — 
22 MR. WICKS: No. Your Honor, I never was extradited to 
23 the state of Florida. I have — I was in Duval — when it 
24 mentions in there about Duval County Court, that's in 
25 Jacksonville. Yes. I was there, and I was charged with 
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1 forgery, and it was dismissed. But I was never — this 
2 Maywood, Illinois — Illinois. I've never heard of them. 
3 MR. JACKSON: And Middleton, Pennsylvania? 
4 MR. WICKS: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is where I had 
5 my first conviction. 
6 MR. JACKSON: There is a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
7 conviction listed on here, but — 
8 I MR. WICKS: Maywood, no; Middleton, no. 
9 MR. JACKSON: Okay. There's also a second Philadelphia 
10 conviction. 
11 MR. WICKS: Yeah. Your Honor, a lot of them, they are 
12 repeating, like the same — you look at that one. That's 
13 the same thing as the ones on the other page. They're just 
14 repeating them. 
15 MR. JACKSON: Well, this one was listed as 11-6, 1988, 
16 and this one is 11-2, 1989. 
17 MR. WICKS: Okay. Yeah — yeah. That's correct. 
18 MR. JACKSON: So there's two of them? 
19 MR. WICKS: Yes. But I was sentenced together on them. 
20 They ran them together. And Horsham — this one in Horsham, 
21 Pennsylvania — 
22 I MR. JACKSON: These two — you're saying these two 
23 Pennsylvania ones were sentenced together? 
24 MR. WICKS: Yes, sir. 
25 MR. JACKSON: Okay. What about Horsham, Pennsylvania? 
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1 MR. WICKS: No. That's not me. 
2 I MR. JACKSON: All right. Los Alamitos, California. 
3 MR. WICKS: No, sir. That's not me. 
4 MR. JACKSON: All right. 
5 MR. WICKS: And I'm — I haven't seen anything since 
6 I've been locked up. I was in Cuyahoga County Jail. They 
7 ran the NCIC there. I was locked up in the jail in 
8 I St. George, and I had a negative NCIC there, and now all of 
9 a sudden I'm told that I'm the 10 most wanted person. I 
10 haven't seen anything -- I have no — I have one fugative 
11 warrant. I haven't seen anything else that would indicate 
12 that I'm the 10 most wanted person in the world. 
13 MR. JACKSON: He's -- he's got — received a fugative 
14 warrant from Colorado Springs. 
15 Is that correct? 
16 MR. WICKS: Right. And I haven't been — the county 
17 attorney's office hasn't served me with a fugitive warrant 
18 on it, and I haven't been arraigned on it yet. But the 
19 presentence report says that there's 24 outstanding fugitive 
20 warrants pending, and they used their matrix to evaluate me 
21 and to stop me from going to the ninety day program, but I 
22 haven't seen 24 warrants. 
23 MR. JACKSON: He's basically saying that he wants to 
24 address whatever is out there, but presently, there's — 
25 he's not aware of what these 24 states have on him, because 
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1 he's never been — he's never received a warrant, 
2 THE COURT: Okay. What's his ~ 
3 Mr. Wicks, what is your — how many felonies do 
4 you claim that you have been convicted of? 
5 MR. WICKS: I have three prior felony convictions and — 
6 numerous amounts of confrontations with the law where they 
7 either dropped charges or no charges were brought. I have 
8 cashed bad checks. And Cleveland, Ohio, is one of them. 
9 But they didn't convict me. They dismissed the charges 
10 pending extradition to the state of Utah. And the judge 
11 there is Judge Willman. And they can call 443 ~ is it 
12 8560? And they can confirm that they did not convict me of 
13 any crime. 
14 I have — if I have 24 fugitive warrants, Your 
15 Honor, I#d like to see them. But as far as I know, the 
16 reason why I'm not being permitted to be evaluated on the 
17 ninety day is because of — all these warrants has brought 
18 my matrix score up, but I have not seen what they're 
19 allegating [sic] in this presentence report. 
20 I MR. JACKSON: And on the matrix score, Your Honor, 
21 basically what we have here is their score comes up to 17, 
22 which categorizes him as a poor candidate. If he had a 
23 score of 15 or less — if there were two points deducted 
24 off — and I donft know if we get there or not. Basically 
25 it looks like from the report, that there is 19 prior 
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1 misdemeanors, according to the schedule. And so they've 
2 given him the worst classification. But in order for him to 
3 have that readjusted, he has to — he can't have really any 
4 more than seven. 
5 And so we've knocked out — well, let's just — 
6 for argument's sake, let's just say that Mr. Wicks is right, 
7 and so this Casper, Wyoming, one goes — one, two, three, 
8 four, five, six, seven, eight — let's — yeah. Let's try 
9 it that way. Let's count it one, two, three, four, five, 
10 six, seven, eight — there's eight that the disposition is 
11 listed as being a conviction. There's a couple here where 
12 disposition is unknown. That's eight, not counting the ones 
13 that he's taking issue with. So I don't know if it changes 
14 the — it may not change the classification, but the one 
15 place that I think it might is in the category involving 
16 supervision history. They have really — they've listed him 
17 with the worst category, which is basically that he 
18 committed this violation while he was under current 
19 supervision. And that doesn't seem to bear that out in the 
20 report, which if that were reclassified down to a — one of 
21 the other categories below three, then of course he would be 
22 right on the borderline as being a fair candidate, which 
23 would put him into the category of considering an 
24 alternative to prison of — and to where a 90-day diagnostic 
25 evaluation might — might come into play. 
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1 MR. WICKS: I'm not on probation; I'm not on parole. 
2 I'm not on anything from the court. So that is not true 
3 what they have that I'm wanted someplace because of release 
4 and supervision. That would have put me in the ninety day 
5 category. 
6 The last time when I was here before you, and I 
7 asked that motion about — to dismiss, because I said that I 
8 was in Ohio for all that — for these seven months, and that 
9 I didn't get a opportunity to have due process by an 
10 attorney and all that stuff, you said because I didn't have 
11 a memorandum or any type of case law ~ any proof to what I 
12 was saying, that you dismissed it. Well, here, Your Honor. 
13 There's no proof that I am the one ~ 10 most wanted, and 
14 there's no proof of 19 misdemeanors, and there's no proof of 
15 any of supervised release that I'm wanted, and I'm on 
16 probation and parole. And I think if you was to use that 
17 against me without any proof, it would be unfair. 
18 MR. JACKSON: We would take issue with the fact that 
19 there's — the report makes mention of this, that he's on 
20 the 10 most wanted list. We don't know that. I haven't 
21 seen anything that reflects that. It does come into 
22 consideration in the — in the actual evaluation. Where the 
23 summary is put together — evaluative summary is put 
24 together, it does list that as a factor that was considered 
25 in coming in with this. 
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1 I It's also listed that he's made false statements 
2 and filed numerous grievances and stuff. And — and while 
3 he has tried to effectuate his rights in this case, I don't 
4 think he's done it with the intent to try to hassle anybody 
5 or whatever. He certainly objects to the classification 
6 that — that he's filed false statements. 
7 And I guess in a nutshell, what we're requesting 
8 is two things. Number one, that the Court consider rather 
9 I as — rather than just committing him, that the Court 
10 consider a 90-day evaluation to «-- for further 
11 consideration. We believe that it's warranted in — given 
12 his — his acknowledged substance abuse problem as well as 
13 his mental health problem. There might be something that he 
14 could — even if he is committed, that he could start 
15 accessing while he were in prison. And it's worth it to the 
16 State to try to — to try to reconcile that. And so the 
17 ninety day would be very helpful in diagnosing Mr. Wicks, 
18 even if the Court ultimately did convict him — or did 
19 sentence him to — to prison after the ninety day. 
20 Secondly, we would ask the Court to consider 
21 running this matter concurrently with the Washington County 
22 matter. And this we would request the Court do, number one, 
23 because he has cooperated. He came in; he pled guilty 
24 pursuant to a plea agreement. He — he has cooperated. 
25 Granted, he's made an extensive effort to try to assert 
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certain rights and whatnot, but in every sense, he's tried 
to cooperate in providing information and whatnot. 
And additionally, that — that these matters are 
just really related to the same — it's just a continuation 
of his same mental condition when it was all happening, 
which he's acknowledged. And so as a consequence, we would 
ask that the Court run that together. 
There's also the additional factor for the Court 
to consider in terms of restitution. Where there is a 
significant amount of restitution involved, if — if they 
were to run consecutively, the victims would be that much 
further down the road before he could start paying on 
restitution, whereas if they were run concurrently, it would 
allow him to get out and start making restitution sooner to 
the victim. 
And we'd submit it on that, unless you have 
something further you want to add. 
MR. WICKS: Your Honor, I had the opportunity to sit 
here and witness a lot of people go before you, and a lot of 
them asked you to give them a break. Well, with my record, 
I don't expect you to give me a break. You're the judge, 
and I'm the criminal, and I'm not going to deny that. I 
don't have any excuse for my previous behavior other than 
the fact that I'm — I'm addicted to drugs. And that's the 
bottom line. 
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1 I've been to prison before. I was at the Arizona 
2 State Penitentiary. I was sentenced to four years. I did 
3 18 months of that four years. They gave me $50 to get out 
4 of prison, and the first thing — the whole time I was in 
5 prison, I didn't do any drugs. But as soon as I got out — 
6 and they gave me a brand new pair of shoes and pants and 
7 $50. What I did with the $50 is went and bought some. 
8 The the whole time that I've been on the street, 
9 I've been — I went to — the military spent a lot of money 
10 on me to train me to be a good paralegal. To train me to be 
11 a cook. I've been to college and made pretty good money, 
12 but I've still got this problem with drugs. 
13 I can't go to a drug rehab program, because you've 
14 got too many other people out there on the street with the 
15 same kind of problem that I have. So the only way you can 
16 get into a program is if you were rich — and if I was rich, 
17 I probably would buy drugs with the money — or a judge can 
18 put you in a program. They've got programs at the prison; 
19 so — they call you while you're sitting there. Talk about 
20 your problems. But it's not effective. I've — I've been 
21 through it. I've tried. And that's the reason why I have 
22 been writing you so many letters• And if you read the 
23 letters that I wrote to you, that's the reason I was asking 
24 for a ninety-day commitment in the mental hospital. If they 
25 think I belong there, they'll keep me there more than what 
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1 you can even sentence me on this charge. 
2 I am asking you for some help. I don't want you 
3 to just put me in a prison and say, ,fHey, in 18 months, let 
4 him back on the street and see who else he's going to 
5 victimize.ff I want to cure this problem. And the only way 
6 I'm going to get it cured is — I mean if you put me in 
7 prison ~ I don't know. That's — 
8 THE COURT: All right. I have ~ I've read the 
9 correspondence. And let me just address a few of the 
10 matters that you've raised. 
11 First of all, you've indicated in one letter that 
12 Mr. Jackson won't represent anything on appeal. 
13 But it's my understanding that your contract — 
14 you and Mr. Park — with the county is to handle that 
15 appeal. 
16 MR. JACKSON: That's correct, Your Honor. We handle the 
17 first appeal. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. And that may be affected since one of 
19 the rights you gave up with a guilty plea in general is the 
20 right to an appeal. And the guilty plea was entered. But 
21 Mr. Jackson, if an appeal is appropriate, would represent 
22 you on that. 
23 I MR. JACKSON: Sure. 
24 THE COURT: Secondly, your request for mental health 
25 treatment I don't quite understand. I understand the 
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1 request for a 90-day diagnostic or however many days it ends 
2 up being with the department of corrections. They have now 
3 changed it to where it's for an indeterminate amount of 
4 time. Anywhere from 45 to 90 days, as I understand it. 
5 It's different than — than the Court finding you mentally 
6 incompetent and sending you to a state mental hospital for a 
7 period of time. 
8 I haven't seen anything from you that would 
9 indicate to me that you're not intelligent; that you don't 
10 know where you are, and what's going on. You're 
11 articulate. And while everything has been pro se, there's 
12 been nothing that I've read that made me think that — that 
13 you weren't competent to — to be here in court. 
14 MR. WICKS: I was in the state hospital twice for drug 
15 addiction with a — where they put me in there, and they 
16 made me — lock — they locked me in the maximum lock down, 
17 and they were — give me — I'm on Sineguan and Thorazine. 
18 That's why they said in the report that I have a severe 
19 mental health. It's not because the hospital thinks I'm 
20 stupid or anything, they just — at the hospital, if I had 
21 had the money to stay, they could treat me for the 
22 addiction. 
23 But I can't be released. That's the reason why I 
24 was asking for the hospital . Because for me to say, "Hey 
25 Judge, I want to go to Horizon," you know, are you kidding? 
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1 I can walk right in and walk right out of there. I was 
2 asking someplace where you would know that they can't 
3 release me; that I will be under the state, and that I'm not 
4 going to be released until somebody that has enough 
5 intelligence to realize, wHey, this guy has a problem, and 
6 he's well now." 
7 THE COURT: So your request for mental health treatment 
8 is a request that rather than prison, you be sent to a 
9 facility that has drug addiction — 
10 MR. WICKS: The state hospital. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. JACKSON: And that's something that could be 
13 evaluated and assessed on a ninety day. 
14 THE COURT: All right. I understand that point, then, 
15 now, I believe. And on the habeas corpus, I think that 
16 would have to be addressed after some resolution or a final 
17 determination of appeal rights has been concluded. 
18 Having said that, I'm going to now let the State 
19 respond. I'll give you both another chance in a minute, as 
20 far as sentencing. 
21 I MR. LATIMER: As far as the habeas corpus, I can inform 
22 the Court that that's been filed in Judge Eves' court. It 
23 was called on last week's calendar — yeah. Last Monday. 
24 It hadn't been served on the attorney general's office; so, 
25 the Court continued it until service could be made on the 
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1 attorney general. So that's in the process. 
2 In response to the PSI, the State concurs strongly 
3 in the recommendation for a consecutive prison sentence and 
4 is kind of dumbfounded to sit here and listen to Mr. Wicks 
5 go on and on about how he disputes everything, when what we 
6 have is a person with multiple convictions involving 
7 dishonesty, multiple false names, multiple false dates of 
8 employment, multiple false Social Security numbers, claims 
9 of military record that can't be verified, claims of 
10 employment that can't be verified. He lied as to his 
11 criminal record. He said in his letter that he started at 
12 26. He had convictions for forgery in 1979 and 1980, when 
13 he was only 20. He lied to the bank clerks here; he's lied 
14 to this court. He's come in and is asking you to be 
15 released from jail. He claimed an excuse once, and that 
16 didn't work. Came back in the next week and claimed another 
17 excuse; that didn't work. He comes back in. I think three 
18 different excuses. But he claims he can't remember of 
19 committing the crime. 
20 I It's the State's position that all the evidence in 
21 the PSI is — is trustworthy. Just because Mr. Wicks 
22 doesn't know about it doesn't mean it doesn't exist. There 
23 are the warrants; there is the status on the 10 most wanted 
24 list. We think he's had his chances. A diagnostic is going 
25 to be a waste of time. 
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THE COURT: That was a regional 10 most wanted — 
MR. LATIMER: A regional. I got — I don't remember who 
it was that reported it. 
THE COURT: — wasn't it? I'm just going off memory. 
MR. JACKSON: It says in the report it's a regional. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LATIMER: We just think that he's earned a 
consecutive prison sentence, and we'd ask the Court to 
follow that recommendation. 
THE COURT: Okay. And the reason I'm saying I'm going 
off memory is I've given the defendant my copy; so — 
MR. JACKSON: Just a couple of other items, Your Honor. 
We concede that the — that the amount of time that the 
defendant has served to date is 218 days. We're requesting 
that he be given credit for the time served, if the Court 
is — is inclined to just go ahead and commit him to prison, 
as they did in Washington County. 
At the same time, however, Your Honor, we — we 
would rebut by simply saying that — that by sending 
Mr. Wicks up on a ninety day, the State — the State isn't 
prejudiced by that. If anything, it just gives this court 
further information on which to.make an assessment. 
And one of the questions I guess that's — that's 
there — and I guess we have to say to Mr. Latimer, he's 
right — he's exactly right on everything. He's lied, and 
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1 he's — he's deceived. He's done that. And we would 
2 respond by simply saying but that's what happens when a 
3 person has really got a problem. 
4 Here's the first time where there's really any 
5 evidence or any — anything being confronted where Mr. Wicks 
6 is saying, "Yeah. I've got a problem. I want to deal with 
7 that problem.11 And really just to see if he's sincere or 
8 not, we'd ought to send him up on a ninety day. And if they 
9 tell him, and he doesn't jump through the hoops or whatever 
10 to get into a program, or he's not willing to do that, then 
11 he's going to be back here and sentenced per statute 
12 anyway. So I don't see that the State loses anything by 
13 sending him up there, but there is the opportunity there — 
14 however slim it is — that Mr. Wicks does fall within 
15 something, that he might get some help, and we put an end to 
16 all of this criminal behavior, where otherwise when 
17 Mr. Wicks serves his 18 months or two years or five years or 
18 whatever it is, and he goes on and — and never really 
19 corrects that sort of behavior anyway. 
20 I We'll submit it on that, Your Honor. We do feel 
21 that he ought to get credit on the time served. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Could you give me the 
23 presentence report back. I'll have a look at that. 
24 Even if I take out some of these felony 
25 convictions, I still think the matrix — and I'm not sure 
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1 that that's a good idea, based on the defendant's lack of 
2 honesty with the Court in the past — the criminal record is 
3 too extensive, and I/m going to follow the agency's 
4 recommendation and impose sentence pursuant to the statute. 
5 Zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, a $5,000 fine, 
6 restitution of $750 and to serve the sentence consecutive to 
7 any sentence received out of the Washington County case. 
8 I'll give the defendant credit for 218 days served, if 
9 that's, in fact, what — the number of days. 
10 MR. LATIMER: My understanding — I'm not sure, but I 
11 know this comes up before in Judge Eves' court. It's his 
12 opinion that the board of pardons makes that call. 
13 THE COURT: All right. 
14 MR. LATIMER: But I'll include it in the judgment. 
15 THE COURT: Let's include it in the judgment. And then 
16 if it's within their jurisdiction, they'll have the final ~ 
17 MR. WICKS: Is that 218? Is that what — 
18 I MR. JACKSON: 218• 
19 THE COURT: That's what I was told ~ 
20 MR. LATIMER: All right. 
21 THE COURT: — that's what the actual days are. 
22 All right. That's the order to be prepared by the 
23 county attorney's office. 
24 MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, the ~ there is a ~ 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 I MR. JACKSON: There is apparently a van or something 
2 that's going up pretty quick. He'd like to be sent up as 
3 soon as possible. 
4 THE COURT; All right. As soon as transportation can be 
5 arranged, it's to occur. 
6 MR. JACKSON: Thank you. 
7 (Whereupon the proceedings in the above-entitled 
8 matter were concluded.) 
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